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Abstract: CSCL research is often closely connected to dialogic theories of learning and 
human cognition with an emphasis on shared meaning making. Without neglecting this 
viewpoint we give reasons for an alternative framework. We call this alternative a 
“trialogical” approach; it emphasizes joint and organized work with artefacts and 
practices as a basis for collaborative learning. The paper explains the use of this notion 
and clarifies theoretical backgrounds for the approach in line with the knowledge 
creation metaphor of learning, and relates it especially to knowledge building and 
socio-cultural and cultural-historical theories of human cognition. Various theories 
concerning mediation are briefly analyzed. The paper also explains how dialogues and 
trialogues are close to each other if, for example, the role of common ground is 
analyzed further. Lastly, design principles of the trialogical approach are concisely 
described. 
 
1 Introduction  
It appears that throughout its relatively short history Computer-Supported Collaborative 
Learning (CSCL) has aimed at defining its paradigmatic starting points (see 
Koschmann 1996, 1999, Koschmann et al 2002; Stahl et al 2006). This is not surprising 
because CSCL has been an emerging research field which is clearly connected to novel 
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ways of understanding fundamental epistemological, methodological, and also 
ontological questions concerning human cognition and activity. CSCL is married to 
basic conceptions of the socially, materially, culturally, and technologically distributed 
nature of human cognition. Yet there are different interpretations how these challenges 
and possibilities are interpreted, and which broader research traditions provide as a 
background for CSCL research (e.g., neo-Piagetian framework, a socio-cultural 
approach, situated cognition, knowledge building). 
One very prominent candidate for providing the foundations for CSCL is closely 
connected to dialogic theories of learning and human cognition, and interactional or 
shared meaning making (Koschmann 1999; Stahl et al 2006; Wegerif 2006; Suthers 
2006). This is a quite appealing approach for understanding the basics of CSCL. It 
seems, at least in general terms, to fit nicely to many approaches important in the CSCL 
tradition, such as Bakhtin’s ideas of multiple voices (Koschmann 1999), inquiry 
processes with question and answers (e.g., Muukkonen et al 2004), argumentative skills 
(e.g.. Andriessen et al 2003), or more general skills of communication and dialogues 
(Wegerif 2006). In more general terms, this can be connected to the idea that human 
cognition is mediated by tools (especially by technology) and by signs (Vygotsky 
1978). Sign-processes are usually interpreted as fundamentally dialogical (see Wertsch 
1991; also Peirce 1931-1958).  
There are clear differences how the dialogic approach is interpreted within the 
CSCL tradition. For example, Wegerif (2006; 2007) makes a clear separation of the 
dialogic approach from the dialectic (and Vygotskyan) tradition whereas Koschmann 
has interpreted them more in line with each other (Koschmann 1999). Still, dialogic 
theories have been seen to provide a basis for CSCL because they lay a foundation for 
understanding meaning making involved in collaborative discussions mediated by 
computers. 
Despite strong arguments to support the claim that the dialogic theories and 
meaning making form a basis for CSCL, the present paper is focused on developing a 
different way of considering the foundations of CSCL; we develop on object-centered, 
trialogical approach to CSCL that appear to bring issues different from the dialogical 
approach to the foci. The argument is not that the importance of meaning making and 
dialogues should be neglected, but rather that is should be supplemented with 
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approaches emphasizing joint work with artefacts and practices. In this paper we aim at 
giving theoretical reasons and background for this kind of a shift towards, what we call, 
a “trialogical” emphasis of CSCL, and shortly explain our own work with this 
emphasis. We do not, however, see dialogical and trialogical approaches are mutually 
exclusive but examine a continuum from dialogues to trialogues. 
 
2 From the knowledge-creation metaphor to trialogues  
We have previously maintained that it is useful to differentiate a knowledge-creation 
metaphor of learning as a third main metaphor for learning as a supplement to Anna 
Sfard’s distinction between the acquisition and the participation metaphors of learning 
(Paavola et al 2002; Paavola et al 2004; Hakkarainen et al 2004; Sfard 1998). The idea 
has been that there are different theories of collaborative work and learning which, 
despite their clear differences, have also a common aim of explicating collaborative 
processes of creating or developing something new. As representative theories of the 
knowledge-creation metaphor we have ourselves analyzed especially Bereiter’s 
knowledge building (Bereiter 2002), Engeström’s expansive learning (Engeström 
1987), and Nonaka & Takeuchi’s organizational knowledge creation (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi 1995). These theories have clear affinities to theories representing the 
participation metaphor of learning but still have a different focus especially when 
directed to processes clarifying collaborative or distributed creativity. The knowledge-
creation metaphor is not meant to be a theory of collaborative learning but more like an 
umbrella term (or a meta-theoretical conception) highlighting underlying similarities 
across otherwise quite different theories and approaches to collaborative learning and 
work. We think that it is useful to point out similarities and fruitful tensions between 
these theories.  
On the basis of these theories representing the knowledge-creation metaphor we 
have tried to analyze what can be learned for developing central aspects of collaborative 
learning further. From this analysis we have proposed the term ‘trialogical’ (or 
‘trialogic’) to refer to those processes where people are collaboratively and 
systematically developing shared, concrete “objects” together (Paavola & Hakkarainen 
2005). The basic idea of trialogues is that “objects” (conceptual or material artefacts, 
practices, ideas) are brought to a more central role than in many traditional theories of 
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human learning. It can be maintained that if the focus is on how people jointly develop 
and create such ‘objects’, many dichotomies connected to the learning theories must be 
thought anew; for example, both individuals and social processes must be taken into 
account, and both conceptual artefacts and practices are important. We think that 
theories representing the knowledge-creation metaphor are just aiming at finding ways 
of overcoming these kinds of dichotomies to understand the dynamics of collaborative 
creativity. 
In trialogues, the interaction through “shared objects” that are in the process of 
being developed is emphasized (see Figure 1). These objects of inquiry can be 
knowledge artefacts, practices, ideas, models, representations, etc. but understood as 
something concrete to be developed collaboratively. These objects or drafts of objects 
have a prominent role in the interaction (so it is an interaction between subject(s), other 
subjects, and “objects”, not, for example between subjects). The temporal dimension is 
also important in trialogues in terms of the shared objects being developed and 
modified iteratively; novelty and innovation emerge only through sustained processes. 
The objects being developed are meant for some subsequent use and/or potentially to be 
modified later on. This anticipation of use provides criteria to modify the object 
collaboratively. In trialogues the object is something concrete (even ideas and 
conceptions must be externalized to be shared and developed) but at the same time it is 
something in the process of being developed (cf. epistemic artefacts – Knorr-Cetina 
2001). Trialogues mean, then, those processes where things are developed 
collaboratively; there is not just work with static objects. The emphasis is on developing 





Figure 1. An illustration of the trialogical approach to learning presenting some of the 
basic elements of it. 
 
 
One important background for the trialogical approach is the knowledge 
building approach. Knowledge building derives from Karl Popper’s (1972) idea of three 
“worlds” as a basis for understanding human epistemology. According to this, human 
beings are special in being able to produce cultural or conceptual artefacts which are 
something different from mental processes within human brain or head, or material 
things. Carl Bereiter and Marlene Scardamalia (Scardamalia & Bereiter 1994; Bereiter 
2002) with their colleagues have developed this approach very systematically to 
emphasize a joint idea improvement by students supported by specialized technology 
for knowledge building.  
Knowledge building can also be interpreted as a form of a trialogical process 
although our own interpretation of trialogues emphasizes more the role of practices and 
material aspects of artefacts than is the case in knowledge building (Hakkarainen, in 
press). The strength of knowledge building is that it emphasizes so emphatically ways 
of organizing students’ work for collaborative idea improvement. But the cost is that it 
easily loses sight of more “mundane” practices and processes, and also of the ways that 















collaboratively. Knowledge building has leaned heavily on Popper’s epistemology with 
three “worlds” (material, mental, and cultural/conceptual), but we think that broader, 
and also more elaborate epistemology would be provided by Charles S. Peirce’s sign-
theoretical approach. In this kind of a Peircean approach three “categories” 
(ideas/qualities – actual things – mediation/conceptions) are intertwined, and the 
meaning of conceptions is closely related to practicalities and “brute” happenings of the 
world (Peirce 1931-1958). Without going in any detailed arguments, we think that 
Peirce’s and Popper’s epistemology are closely related (see Skagestad 1993) but 
Popper’s epistemology easily creates a conceptual “world” which is too separate from 
other aspects of reality. 
Another central background for the notion of ’trialogues’ is the socio-cultural 
theory, and the cultural-historical activity theory. The cultural-historical approach 
builds on the idea that human activities are mediated by artefacts, used and modified by 
succeeding generations of human beings and grounded on practical, everyday activities 
(Cole 1996, 108-110). Praxis, or practices, and cultural artefacts are developed in 
interaction with each other in historically situated and evolving processes (Miettinen & 
Virkkunen 2005). Human activity is “object-oriented” which means that also collective 
activity has an object of activity (related to the “motive”, or to the concrete outcomes of 
that activity) which characterizes how activities are, in general, understood or explained 
(Engeström 1987).  
This is in line with Marx Wartofsky’s (1979) historical epistemology according 
to which structures that constrain and guide human perception and action are not 
universal and unchangeable – as assumed by Immanuel Kant – but products of human 
history, being continuously created and transformed by human beings. According to 
Wartofsky modes of cognitive praxis are subject to historical development. The central 
idea is that epistemic artefacts profoundly change the nature of humans' epistemic 
activity in general, and learning in particular, so that "artifact is to cultural evolution 
what the gene is to biological evolution" (Wartofsky 1979, p. 205). Wartofsky separated 
different levels of artefacts; primary artefacts are tools and practices directly used in 
human labour and other activities, secondary artefacts are “symbolic externalizations” 
or “objectifications” of primary artefacts; and tertiary artefacts that mediate relations 
between primary and secondary artefacts and no longer have a direct representational 
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function but represent visions, anticipated changes and possibilities that may be used to 
change the world. Wartofsky also maintained that these artefacts are not in the mind as 
mental entities, but are externally embodied in socially shared practices, social 
organizations, and culturally shared ideas. 
The notion of “trialogues” owes, then, a great deal to socio-cultural and cultural-
historical theories about human cognition. We think, however, that trialogical processes 
of knowledge creation can be and have been developed within many research traditions 
(without necessarily using the term “trialogues”), so the meaning of these processes 
should be seen across various research traditions. Trialogues concern those processes 
where people organize their work and creativity for developing some concrete (material 
and conceptual) artefacts and/or practices together for some subsequent use by 
developing various versions of the artefacts and/or practices often in long-term 
processes. According to Knorr-Cetina (2001) the work with epistemic objects and 
epistemic practices more and more characterizes modern knowledge work. Epistemic 
objects or ‘epistemic things’ (Rheinberger 1997) are knowledge objects which are in the 
process of being defined, and more open-ended than traditional ‘objects’ (typical 
examples are objects investigated by scientists which are often in the process of being 
defined as the end result of the investigations, but there is no “end” point for these 
future oriented processes). Similarly practices have been traditionally defined as 
recurrent processes and rule-based routines but modern epistemic practices challenge 
this viewpoint (see also Miettinen & Virkkunen 2005). Knowledge-centered work 
requires a more dynamic, creative, and reflective notion of practice. We maintain that 
these processes with epistemic objects and epistemic practices are trialogical processes. 
The term of ‘object’ or ‘shared object’ is used in this paper in a theoretical 
sense. Objects or object-orientedness of human activity has aroused a lot of discussion 
lately, especially within activity theory (Kaptelinin & Miettinen, 2005; Engeström & 
Blackler, 2005; Miettinen, 1998). For us, object-orientedness gives an important 
perspective on learning and the design of educational settings also outside the 
framework of activity theory. We are applying ideas of object-orientedness from 
activity theory more generally in order to build a framework where collaborative work 
with shared objects is emphasized as a potential design principle of educational 
practice. Shared objects can then be knowledge artefacts (papers, models, plans), or 
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practices which are developed iteratively together. In the “trialogical” sense the notion 
of an ‘object’ comes close to epistemic objects defined by Knorr-Cetina (2001), and is 
related to at least two basic meanings of the term also in a colloquial speech. Objects 
have concrete, thing-like characteristics but they are also something to which actions 
are directed (cf. Engeström & Blackler, 2005). “Trialogical objects” are those thing-like 
practices or artefacts which people are jointly modifying or versioning, but in order to 
understand the process of developing these “trialogical objects” it must be understood 
to which purposes and by which means they are produced. By paraphrasing Peircean 
semiotics: there must be also at least “final objects”, which are giving guidance to the 
process (not “final” in an absolute sense; also these final objects are changing; but 
towards which the activity is directed). As an example: if people are jointly modifying 
and versioning a research paper (which is then a trialogical object) they have some 
ideas of what it should look like (about its structure and content, etc., that is, about its 
“final object”). 
We are not maintaining that theories and approaches mentioned above are an 
exhaustive list of theories analyzing trialogical processes. For example, Papert’s 
constructionism (Papert & Harel 1991) comes close to many aspects emphasized in 
trialogues1. Constructionism emphasizes people as active constructors of their 
knowledge (similarly to constructivism) but not so much construction of mental models 
(or related things) but things of the real world, usually co-designing something tangible 
(like building LEGO/Logo). Instead of “instructionism” (and transmission of 
knowledge) it focuses on constructionism, and more long-term work with meaningful 
products. Resnick (1996) has introduced the term distributed constructionism to 
highlight constructionism with things that are seen important in distributed cognition, 
like collaboration and the use of technology to support constructions. We see these as 
ways of enlightening different kinds of trialogical processes. Above are mentioned 
mostly those theories which have influenced our own conception of trialogical 
processes.  
                                                
1 We thank the anonymous reviewer of this paper for pointing out this connection. 
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If trialogical processes are treated in many approaches, why to name them with 
a new term?2 Is there anything novel here? We think that it is important to emphasize 
the meaning of these kinds of processes, and to develop ways of analyzing and 
supporting them. These processes are easily neglected and especially an interaction 
between various processes supporting trialogues are not seen (for example, work with 
knowledge artefacts and practices) when CSCL approaches are developed. In this sense 
it is useful to see similarities and differences within various theories concerning 
mediation or mediated activity, like Popper’s theory of three worlds, Peirce’s sign 
theoretically and pragmatically oriented theory, and Vygotskyan tradition (socio-
cultural and cultural-historical theories) with the aim of developing them further (cf. 
Engeström 1987, 37-73). We have tried to give above some hints of potential re-
evaluations from the perspective of “trialogues”. Popper’s (and Bereiter’s) cultural or 
conceptual artefacts could be interpreted more closely related to practices and material 
things. Peirce’s sign processes can be interpreted more like joint work with external 
artefacts in culturally embedded processes. Vygotsky (1978, 40) maintained that human 
beings can control their behaviour as if outside (i.e. culturally) by the means of signs 
and tools which mediate human activity. In trialogical processes these mediating 
elements are artefacts and practices which can be taken to be jointly constructed and 
developed (see Miettinen & Virkkunen 2005; 2006).  
One paradigmatic example of a trialogical work process is the way joint 
research articles (as shared “objects”) are produced in successful, collaborative 
processes. Often one person has the most central role of organizing the work and 
producing the basic parts of the text, but in successful cases, other writers can add and 
modify important parts of the text, so that in the end it is not easy to remember exactly 
who has produced which part of the text. The article itself, or more specifically, drafts 
of this article have an important role of organizing the work and suggesting and 
                                                
2 The term “trialogues” have been used before in a bit different senses. Dictionaries define 
trialogues sometimes as a conversation, colloquy or discussion between three people or groups 
(or see a bit different meaning: Wiley 1994). Etymologically the term might be a bit clumsy in 
our usage (thanks for Alexander Porshnev for pointing this out) but we are using it to refer to 
mediated processes (with triadic structures) and as an alternative to dia-logues with the start of 
‘tria-’. In dialogues interaction happens through words and concepts and by communicating and 




constraining how to continue to modify and develop it. Sometimes two (or more) 
persons have so much common ground and overlap in their research interests that they 
can create a joint research paper on the basis of their previous texts without knowing in 
detail who has been responsible for producing which part of the text but the text itself 
instigates new ideas. There are many things that influence to the good result; agreement 
and trust on each others working practices is central part of these kinds of processes, as 
well as feedback from persons outside.  
Another example is from the working life context when activities or routines are 
taken as a joint object of inquiry to be developed (Engeström 2001; Miettinen & 
Virkkunen 2005). This requires the use of various kinds of models and concepts but the 
object of inquiry in these cases is the practices and activities, not conceptual artefacts as 
such.  
 
3 From dialogues to trialogues 
We think that it is important to see a continuum (theoretically and practically) from 
dialogues (and meaning making) to trialogues (collaborative work with shared objects). 
Dialogic theories typically emphasize such things as communication skills, expressions 
of different perspectives, having multiple voices, sharing meaning, providing shared 
understanding. Trialogical processes seem to require extra efforts from people (even 
more than dialogues). Trialogues require usually dialogues, that is, negotiations on 
meanings, commenting, discussions, etc. Sometimes it is hard to make a distinction 
between the two. Still, the differences between these two should be seen and analyzed.  
One fundamental problem and challenge (also a theoretical problem) 
emphasized in dialogues is how human beings are able to focus on certain issues with 
their multiple voices, perspectives and languages, or how they can reach mutual 
understanding (see Arrighi & Ferrario 2008) . One answer (or an outline for the answer) 
is provided with the notion of common ground. In order to ensure communication 
people must have ways of grounding and providing common ground for their dialogues, 
that is, to have some degree of shared history or knowledge in common to ensure that 
they are not talking about totally different things or using language with totally different 
meanings (Clark & Brennan 1991).  
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Peirce already emphasized in his theory of signs that signs and dialogues are not 
understandable without such common ground or “collateral observation”. 
 
“The universe must be well known and mutually known to be known 
and agreed to exist, in some sense, between speaker and hearer, 
between the mind as appealing to its own further consideration and the 
mind as so appealed to, or there can be no communication, or 
'common ground,' at all.” (Peirce 1931-1958, 3.621; see also ibid., 
6.338; 8.179) 
 
Peirce emphasized the use of indexical signs which refer to some existing or actual 
happenings or objects (in real or fictional world) common to those who are in dialogues 
with each other to convey any meaning (Peirce, 1931-1958, 8.112).  
Arrighi and Ferrario (2008) have emphasized that human beings very often 
correct and reshape the common ground during conversation. This happens by taking 
extralinguistic aspects into account while interpreting each other’s sentences or 
utterances. People are interpreting utterances, and constructing their common ground 
intersubjectively (by negotiating on meanings), and by being in interaction with their 
environment (ibid.). Common ground is not something static but in the process of being 
negotiated in relation to (indexical) features of the environment.   
Arrighi and Ferrario relate this approach to Donald Davidson’s ideas about 
triangulation as a basis for human cognition and knowledge. Davidson (2001) maintains 
that epistemology should be built on a model where subjectivity, intersubjectivity and 
objectivity are inseparably linked (in contrast, for example, to the Cartesian 
epistemology which starts from a quest for subjective certainty). Knowledge of other 
minds, knowledge of our own minds, and knowledge of the world are mutually 
dependent, and cannot be reduced to each other. It means, for example, that if we are 
aiming at understanding the meaning of words, or how signs are used, we cannot start 
from “objective” meanings of words and signs, nor from subjective meanings, or not 
even intersubjective or cultural meanings but fundamentally from a dynamic theory 
where subjective meanings, intersubjective aspects, and objective facts and happenings 
are all taken into account. 
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A bit similar broadening of the notion of common ground is provided by the 
approach of “anchored discussion” (Van der Pol 2007). Online discussion can be 
supported by anchoring it to study material or documents which are the topic of the 
discussion. So instead of having more commonly used threaded discussion, grounding 
is made easier by having tools where study materials and documents to which 
discussion is referring is available on the screen, and annotations and notes can be 
pointed to specific parts of the documents (ibid.). 
These approaches to dialogues where the role of constructing common ground 
with Davidson’s frame of triangulation, and anchored discussion with indexical 
relations between discussions and study material being discussed come very close to the 
ideas of trialogues, as also noted by these authors (Arrighi & Ferrario 2008, 82; Van der 
Pol 2007, 127). The difference is that in trialogues the central aim is not to enhance 
dialogues but the common ground is provided by jointly constructing external 
representations, practices and artefacts (dialogues can, of course, help here). In 
trialogical processes the common ground is deepened (and provided) by modifying 
those artefacts and practices (“shared objects”) which are objects of joint activity. In 
trialogues we are not interacting only with words or concepts (emphasized in dialogues) 
but also modifying conceptual artefacts, external representations, and practices. We are 
(or can be) both indexically and symbolically attached to the shared objects. 
Participants of joint activity do not need necessarily to have complete agreement or 
shared understanding of these shared objects (which is the same with the common 
ground in general), but these shared objects provide a concrete reference point which 
can then be collaboratively modified and clarified during the process.  
Another way of “broadening” dialogues towards trialogues, or seeing this 
connection, is to use inquiry models or question-answer processes as a starting point. 
The interrogative model of inquiry conceptualizes epistemological processes as 
question-answer steps (Hintikka 1999; Hakkarainen & Sintonen 2002). Human beings 
(as inquirers) acquire knowledge by putting questions to other humans or to the 
“nature”. According to this formulation, also nature can provide answers to questions 
provided by the inquirer, for example, with experiments. These formulations capture an 
important basis of epistemology for inquiry processes. We think, however, that this 
kind of a framework should be broadened if conceptions about distributed cognition are 
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taken into account; and this is a way of coming close to the trialogical processes 
(Paavola et al 2006). The distributed approach means that the role of external artefacts 
and practices frame the way how people are putting questions and giving answers 
during the process of inquiry. Existing artefacts (theories, models, methodologies, etc.) 
and practices give elements and basic means for the question-answer steps, and usually 
the aim is also to modify and frame novel artefacts and practices during the process.  
Instead of having a “game” with two players (either the inquirer(s) and nature, 
or the inquirer and a community) the basis for trialogues is then a model with three 
players: an inquirer (making questions, giving answers, or interpreting), “nature” (i.e. 
the target of the research including artefacts and practices), and a community (making 
questions, giving answers, or interpreting) (cf. Pera 1994). Inquirers are making 
inquiries about nature with other inquirers but at the same time using and producing 
cultural or conceptual artefacts. The inquiry process happens in trialogues through 
developing these mediating artefacts and practices.  
Similarly sign processes can be interpreted anew from the trialogical perspective 
if it is taken into account that human beings are able jointly to produce external 
representations and signs to be re-interpreted by others (see Skagestad 1993). We are 
not just interpreting signs but also producing signs as external representations with 
others to be interpreted and modified in the future.   
The line between dialogues and trialogues, and similarly with the participation 
and knowledge-creation metaphors of learning, is not, then, absolute. If people are, for 
example, producing a joint research paper, the trialogical work with the text and 
dialogical commenting and discussion about it intertwine a great deal. Still there is a 
clear difference in the emphasis with these two basic frameworks. 
The trialogical approach can be used as a heuristic tool to highlight certain 
aspects of collaborative learning and work. The aim can be to transform existing 
practices of learning from “monological” (starting from individualistic learning), and 
“dialogical” (highlighting such things as participation to expert like practices, 
communication, dialogues) towards more trialogical ones (joint work around shared 
objects and practices supporting this work). How and if these transformations are 
possible is a practical question concerning pedagogical practices but also a theoretical 
question concerning ways of conceptualizing the aims and means of human learning 
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and cognition in general, and within particular pedagogical models. We have 
maintained, for example, that the progressive-inquiry model (Hakkarainen 1998; 
Muukkonen et al 2004) developed in our research group has been transformed from 
having aspects from the acquisition perspective (emphasizing conceptual problems, and 
conceptual scaffolds) towards the participation perspective (emphasizing social and 
cultural aspects and practices supporting inquiry processes). Currently, we are 
struggling to understand progressive-inquiry learning as a form of trialogical activity 
focused on practices of collaboratively advancing a shared object of inquiry, whether it 
is a research problem, theory, plan, product, practice (to be transformed), or project. 
This endeavor requires theoretical and conceptual development and corresponding 
improvements of research methods and methodologies in line with the trialogical 
approach. 
 
4 Affordances for trialogical technology   
A trialogical approach puts joint work around knowledge practices and knowledge 
artefacts to the front. This framework has profoundly affected by the emergence of 
ICTs that transform intangible ideas to shareable digital artifacts. What kind of role 
does such epistemic technology play in trialogical processes? Human beings have taken 
part in activities which can be interpreted as trialogical since the beginning of their very 
history (Donald, 1991; Vygotsky, 1978). By relying on conventional writing, 
visualization, and manufacturing instruments, they can develop knowledge artefacts and 
practices jointly and systematically. Yet, when addressing information and 
communication technologies, investigators have for long emphasized (as the term itself 
says) either information genre or communication genre with monologues and dialogues 
as respective social activities (Enyedy & Hoadley 2006). Further, theories on 
knowledge creation have not paid sufficient attention to the role of epistemic 
technologies in human activity.  
While advancement of open-source development communities, for instance, 
highlight potentials of ICTs to facilitate collaborative or distributed creativity in the 
trialogical sense, ICTs have too often been addressed as something that either allows 
delivering study materials or opening up networking and communication possibilities. 
The success story of Wikipedia is also strengthening the belief about the influence of 
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new technology in knowledge-creation processes.  Such approaches can be interpreted 
as forms or at least nearby phenomena to trialogical processes. Trialogical activities are 
supported by appropriate technologies that help the participants to create and share, 
elaborate and transform, organize and visually model diverse epistemic artifacts in 
conjunction with making visible, reflecting on, and transforming knowledge practices. 
Technology as such is no guarantee of trialogicality but it can give affordances for 
fluent and organized joint work with knowledge artefacts and practices. As we see it the 
trialogical approach requires that theoretical ideas, novel pedagogical practices, and 
technology development are developed together; these changes go together. Also 
outside the CSCL community (and related communities making research on 
collaborative technology) the role of technology to enhance distributed creativity is 
more and more recognized (e.g., Miettinen 2006). 
In a large, five-year (2006-2011) EU-funded Knowledge-Practices laboratory 
(KP-Lab) project, the aim is to develop technology to support forms of trialogical 
learning (http://www.kp-lab.org). Theoretical conceptions of trialogical learning have 
provided directions and ideas for transforming existing pedagogical practices towards 
more trialogical knowledge practices, and for developing related technology. Basic 
characteristics of trialogical learning were defined at the beginning of the KP-Lab 
project. They were formulated on the basis of analyzing basic features in theories 
representing the knowledge creation metaphor of learning (Paavola et al. 2004), and 
using previous experiences of developing learning environments, and in relation to 
pedagogical aims of the project. The knowledge creation metaphor of learning 
transforms many old dichotomies concerning learning theories, such as individual vs. 
community, concepts vs. situations, theory vs. practice (ibid.). The following design 
principles (DPs) were then formulated characterizing the general features of the 
trialogical learning:  
 
DP1) Organizing activities around shared “objects”: A central idea of trialogical 
learning is that work and learning are organized around developing shared, concrete 
objects, that is, conceptual artefacts (e.g., ideas, plans, models), concrete, material 
products (e.g., prototypes, design artefacts) and/or practices (e.g., ways of working in 
higher education). 
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DP2) Supporting interaction between personal and social levels: People integrate their 
own personal work and group’s practices and resources for developing shared objects, 
combining participants’ expertise and contribution into the shared achievement. 
DP3) Eliciting individual and collective agency: Trialogical learning has its basis on 
epistemic agency of the participants; both agency of individual participants in their own 
efforts, but also collective agency supporting social processes and collaborative efforts. 
(This design principle comes close to the previous one, and was actually merged to it in 
later lists of design principles). 
DP4) Fostering long-term processes of knowledge advancement: Trialogical learning 
requires sustained, long-standing work for the advancement of the objects of inquiry. 
DP5) Emphasizing development through transformation and reflection between various 
forms of knowledge and practices: An interaction and transformations between tacit 
knowledge, knowledge practices, and conceptualizations are a driving force in 
processes of knowledge creation. 
DP6) Cross fertilization of various knowledge practices across communities and 
institutions: Knowledge work in KP-Lab engages people in solving complex, authentic 
problems and producing objects also for purposes outside the educational institution; 
An essential aspect of the KP-Lab project is hybridization between schooling/studying 
and research cultures as promoted in various investigative learning practices.  
DP7) Providing flexible tool mediation: Trialogical learning cannot easily be pursued 
without appropriate technologies that help the participants to create and share as well as 
elaborate, reflect and transform knowledge artefacts and practices. Novel collaborative 
technologies should provide affordances for trialogical learning processes. 
 
These design principles themselves have been evaluated and updated during the 
project. They must be interpreted and used somewhat differently in different 
pedagogical contexts (see Ilomäki & Paavola 2008). The challenges and possibilities to 
develop trialogical practices, for example, at research seminars for educational fields at 
the universities are somewhat different than in design courses for engineers at the 
universities of applied sciences, but both can use quite similar technology and benefit 
from “cross-fertilizing” their ways of working. KP-Lab project’s technological design 
can be examined from the perspective of four types of mediation which have been used 
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for specifying the above mentioned design principles to the general aims of the 
technology development. These types of mediation are reformulations of the ones 
introduced by Rabardel and Bourmaud (2003), i.e., epistemic mediation related to 
creating and working with knowledge artefacts, pragmatic mediation related to 
organizing and coordinating knowledge-creation processes, collaborative mediation 
concerning building and managing networked communities and social relations 
required for carrying out knowledge-advancement efforts, and reflective mediation in 
terms of making visible, reflecting on, and transforming knowledge practices. The 
system is designed, then, to support multimediation by providing a shared knowledge 
space that facilitates all four modes of mediation, and the flexible use of them together.  
This paper has, however, concentrated on delineating the theoretical background 
to the meaning of trialogues, or trialogical learning; pedagogical research and 
development (see e.g., Muukkonen et al., in press), and technology development with 
object-bound emphasis (see e.g., Lakkala et al., in press; Paralic & Paralic 2007; 
Furnadziev et al. 2008) are not the focus in this paper. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The trialogical approach is actually not so much a specific theory as a framework that 
assists in facilitating sustained collaborative efforts of developing shared objects. In this 
regard its epistemic status resembles that of the dialogical framework. It is possible to 
create various kinds of (research) approaches around such a framework. You may 
always ask to what extent an approach to CSCL, whether it is related to problem-based, 
project-based or design-based learning, share “trialogical” characteristics and how it 
could be improved in this regard. The present investigation highlights the importance of 
complementing the meaning making tradition with a joint construction of shared 
“trialogical” artefacts and practices. More elaborate models, tools and theories are 
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